




Negative Anthropology: Beckett and Humanism






This essay charts Beckett’s engagement with the concept of the human from the 1930s to the 1980s. Considering in particular his rethinking of what he terms “true humanity” (vraie humanité) in his 1945 essay on the work of the Van Velde brothers, his remarks on “humanity in ruins” in “The Capital of the Ruins” (1946), and his response in early 1949 to Francis Ponge’s claims regarding a humanity to come in an essay on the painter Georges Braque, the essay argues that Beckett not only challenges various forms of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, but undertakes a “negative anthropology” that weakens the distinctions between the human and other animate and inanimate forms of being.

Cet essai vise à restituer la manière dont Beckett s’est emparé du concept de l’humain dès les années 30 jusque dans les années 80. Il traite en particulier  de la « vraie humanité », une notion présente dans son essai de 1945 sur l’œuvre des frères Van Velde. Il envisage aussi « l'humanité en ruines » dans La Capitale des ruines (1946) et dans sa  réponse en 1949 aux déclarations de Francis Ponge à propos d’une humanité à venir dans un essai sur le peintre Georges Braque. Non seulement Beckett conteste les formes variées de l’anthromorphisme et de l’anthropocentrisme, mais il élabore  une « anthropologie négative » qui affaiblit la différence entre l’humain et les autres formes animées et inanimées de l’être.
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Samuel Beckett’s engagement with the concept of the human extended across his writing life, passing through a series of distinct phases, in each of which a clear challenge to humanism is to be detected, and in each of which a particular historical context plays a decisive role. Evidence from early in his writing life of what would prove to be Beckett’s enduring concern with the idea of the human is to be found in the notes that he took on ancient Greek philosophy at the British Museum, in summer 1932. Beckett’s notes on the Sophist philosopher Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490-420 BCE) are often cited in relation to the paradox of the bushel of millet, following Beckett’s suggestion (in a letter to the director Alan Schneider dated 21 November 1957) that Protagoras was possibly the “old Greek” to whom Hamm refers in Endgame (2009b, 42; cf. 2014, 73).​[1]​ However, those notes also include the celebrated dictum attributed to Protagoras that “Man is the measure of all things” (TCD MS 10967/44). With regard to the meaning of the concept of man here, Beckett records from his source that it should be “understood with Plato as individual rather than, with modern view, as ‘Man as such’” (MS 10967/45.1). This emphasis upon the individual rather than the genus fits with the characterization of Protagoras (noted by Beckett) as the “first great individualist, relativist & agnostic” (MS 10967/44). Like Democritus, Protagoras was a member of the Atomistic school, and, as it happens, also from the same town as Democritus. Beckett’s abiding interest in Democritus might thus reasonably be extended to Protagoras, particularly because what is identified in Beckett’s notes as Protagoras’ “phenomenalism” gestures towards the kind of philosophical nominalism that Beckett would embrace explicitly in the 1930s. On the nature of Protagoras’ relativism and scepticism, Beckett notes:

Perception is completely adequate knowledge of what is perceived but no knowledge of the thing. This is the meaning of the Protagorean relativism, according to which things are for every individual as they appear to him; and this he expressed in the famous proposition, Man is the measure of all things.
This is phenomenalism in so far as it teaches knowledge of the phenomenon limited to the individual and the moment: it is scepticism in so far as it rejects all knowledge that transcends that.
MS 10967/44.1; qtd. in Feldman 2006, 37

The Western conception of man (anthropos) that can be traced back to Protagoras is, then, profoundly ambiguous. On the one hand, it seems to authorize a decidedly anthropocentric idea of the human, as that being from which all evaluation proceeds, and from the perspective and interests of which all other forms of being (both animate and inanimate) are to be judged, not least other forms of animal life. This conception of the human finds one of its most influential modern incarnations in Sartrean existentialism, with its core idea that “There is no other universe except the human universe” (Sartre, 55). On the other hand, if understood as “individual,” Protagoras’ idea of the human is of a profoundly limited being, unable to accede to any reliably objective knowledge of the world. Beckett’s engagement with the idea of the human in the half century following his notetaking on Protagoras not only repeatedly challenges the anthropocentric idea of the human as a mastering being, but also involves a weakening of the idea of the human, and, in particular, of any rigorous distinction between the human and the non-human.
	In Beckett’s pre-war work, there are already signs of such a weakening of the idea of the human. In the short story “Dante and the Lobster,” in More Kicks Than Pricks (1934), for instance, the grocer is described as a “warm-hearted human man” (2010a, 8). Rather than merely a comically pleonastic use of the modifier “human” (as distinct from “humane”), this reference to a “human man” suggests the possibility of a “man” that would not in fact be human at all. It is just such a conception of the human that emerges in Beckett’s work in the immediate post-war period, and for which the context is human brutality on an unprecedented scale.
The first sign of what would become Beckett’s sustained attempt to challenge any humanist conception of the human in this post-war context is to be found in the text entitled “The Capital of the Ruins” that he drafted in June 1946 for Raidió Éireann. Although it was never broadcast, this text marks a significant step in Beckett’s thinking of the human, and one in which the historical context plays a significant role. When he was contacted in 1983 by the Beckett scholar Stan Gontarski about the rediscovered radio script, Beckett responded laconically: “No memory whatever of the St. Lô piece. As you say it seems to have been improved here and there by some third party—or parties” (1995, 286). In the text itself, Beckett’s self-deprecation is evident in his identification of it as a “circumlocution” (276), suggesting that the reality around which it circles, the devastated town of Saint-Lô and its inhabitants, could not be captured by any words of his. His response to Gontarski’s enquiry might seem to suggest that the script was not, in Beckett eyes, of any particular importance. And yet, not only does it contain some remarkable first-hand descriptions of the destruction caused by Allied bombing in June 1944, but it ends with what is arguably Beckett’s most powerful and most explicit declaration of the way in which the human condition is henceforth to be viewed. In the text, Beckett observes that Saint-Lô “was bombed out of existence in one night” (277), and that, in the light of the devastation wrought by the Second World War more generally, “‘Provisional’ is not the term it was, in this universe become provisional” (278). That Beckett is taking an historical perspective here is clear: the universe has become provisional, and, as a result, the human being has been displaced, even replaced, by the non-human ruin. In addition to its explicitly historical perspective, the text is also striking on account of Beckett’s engagement with questions of nationality and nationalism, in the form of the “us” (the Irish citizens working at the hospital) and “them” (the French citizens) for whom the hospital had been established.​[2]​ However, both this historical perspective and the national distinctions are subordinated to a vision of “human conditions” that Beckett identifies as at once transhistorical and transnational.​[3]​ For there is, he suggests, a “smile” at these “human conditions” that is shared by the Irish and the French, and this smile is an enduring one, neither to be “extinguished by bombs” nor “broadened by the elixirs of Burroughes and Welcome” (277).
	Appearances notwithstanding, there is no contradiction in “The Capital of the Ruins” between an historical and a transhistorical perspective on those human conditions. For what the recent catastrophe has changed is not those conditions as such, but rather the perception of them. The appalling destruction has enabled a “glimpse” of that smile that signals true insight into the nature of the human condition. The precise form of that perception is important: it is a “glimpse,” no more than that.​[4]​ As for what is glimpsed, it is those human conditions that are to be understood beyond “the having and the not having, the giving and the taking, sickness and health” (1995, 277). What, though, remains of those conditions beyond all possession and all exchange? A first answer is supplied by Beckett at the end of the radio script, when he refers to “a vision and sense of a time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins,” and “an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to be thought again” (278). That transformative vision, Beckett reminds us, “will have been in France” (278)—the context for this glimpse into an enduring conception of the human is at once historically and politically specific. As for this new conception of “humanity in ruins,” Beckett’s post-war work will be nothing if not the attempt to imagine it.
	When, in June 1946, Beckett wrote of, “human conditions,” of “humanity,” and of “our condition,” he was consciously locating himself within a much wider contemporary discourse in France on the human and humanism, one that, as he was among the first to recognize, had been prompted by the historical catastrophe of world war and the Occupation. Arguably the most influential work in this new discourse on humanism was Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism, originally delivered as a lecture at the Club Maintenant in Paris on 29 October 1945, and first published in 1946. In that year, in response to a series of questions posed to him by Beckett’s former friend the philosopher Jean Beaufret on the development of French existentialism, Martin Heidegger’s “Lettre à Jean Beaufret” was also published in the journal Fontaine, the original German version then being reworked for book publication in 1947 under the title Letter on Humanism. In the same year, Maurice Merleau-Ponty published Humanism and Terror. Contributions to a new discourse on humanism were, then, coming from some of the most significant European philosophers of the epoch.
	In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre seeks to demonstrate that, far from being a nihilistic form of anti-humanism, as some on the political Left had been claiming, his form of existentialism is in fact profoundly humanist, placing the human at the centre of things as a powerfully self-shaping being. Sartre’s well-known core idea is that human existence precedes human essence—and everything in his argument follows on from this founding principle. In short, the human being is not predetermined: it is free to shape its own essence through willed action. As Sartre puts it: “Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. This is the first principle of existentialism” (28). His seemingly negative idea of human “abandonment,” which he derives from Heidegger’s notion of Geworfenheit (or “thrownness”) in Being and Time (1927), is, in fact, liberating, enabling the human being to fashion itself independently. Similarly, the “despair” to which Sartre refers is also enabling. Despair, he argues, “merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the sum of the probabilities which render our action feasible” (39). His existentialist humanism is, then, will- and action-centred. As he asserts: “Quietism is the attitude of people who say, ‘let others do what I cannot do’. The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of this, since it declares that there is no reality except in action” (41). Sartre identifies freedom as “the foundation of all values” (51), and declares that “What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity” (47). It is unsurprising that such a message should have resonated with many in a recently liberated Europe.
	While Beckett thought very highly of Sartre’s pre-war novel Nausea (1938),​[5]​ his own post-war conception of “humanity in ruins” is diametrically opposed to Sartre’s existentialist conception of the human condition. Whereas Sartre places the emphasis upon action, freedom, possibility, and will, Beckett insists on weakness, inaction, limitation, unfreedom, and impossibility. Beckett’s decidedly anti-Sartrian conception of the human condition is articulated both in the fiction and in the critical writings that he produced in the immediately post-war years (1946-50), at a time when the philosophical and the political tendency was to celebrate freedom, reconstruction, and new political and social possibilities.
In a fine article on Beckett’s engagement with the idea of the human during this period, Kevin Brazil argues that it was in his writings on painting that Beckett “first developed this questioning of the human” (96). There is certainly some truth to this claim, as evidenced by the long text that Beckett wrote in January 1945 on the Van Velde brothers, Abraham (Bram) and Geer, entitled “La Peinture des van Velde, ou le monde et le pantalon.” In this essay, Beckett states that it is not painting but “the human condition” (la condition humaine) that interests the Van Velde brothers (1983, 129; my translation). The final section of the essay opens: “Let us speak of something else, let us speak of the ‘human’” (131). Beckett then proceeds to observe caustically that the concept of the human is one that tends to be reserved “for times of great massacres” (131). This irony is highlighted by Beckett even before the end of the war, and ten months before Sartre’s Paris lecture on existentialist humanism. And, as numerous publications on the question of the human in the later 1940s would show—most notably those of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger—Beckett was spot-on in his appreciation of that telling irony. The “human,” Beckett adds, is now being debated with unprecedented “fury,” and if something is adjudged not to be human, it is being tossed “into the dustbin” (131)—as, a decade later, would be the figures of Nagg and Nell in Endgame (1957).​[6]​ This current insistence upon the idea of the human is, Beckett asserts, adversely affecting poetry, painting, and philosophy, with the latter now insisting that “Protagoras was right” in his claim that the human being is the measure of all things (132). In such a context, the art of the Van Velde brothers is, Beckett observes, likely to be “stoned.” And yet, crucially, Beckett’s argument is not that the Van Velde brothers take no interest in the human; rather, their art contains what he terms “true humanity” (humanité vraie) (132).
The question thus becomes what is to be understood by “true humanity.” An indication comes in Beckett’s second text on the Van Velde brothers, “Peintres de l’empêchement,” which he wrote in March 1947, ten months after the completion of “The Capital of the Ruins.”​[7]​ There he asserts that the art of the Van Velde brothers is an “analysis of privation” (analyse d’un état de privation); that is, of a process of “endless unveiling” (dévoilement sans fin), the object of which is “the unveilable [l’indévoilable], the nothing, the thing again” (2011, 880; 1983, 136).​[8]​ This something or nothing echoes the object to which Beckett had referred a decade earlier, in his July 1937 letter to Axel Kaun, where he uses precisely the same metaphor of the veil when outlining his view of the literary work, in which it is the language “veil” (Schleier) that has to be torn apart in order to disclose that which lies beyond it, “be it something or nothing” (sei es etwas oder nichts) (2009d, 513-14). What the two essays on the art of the Van Velde brothers suggest is that this “something or nothing” is in fact “true humanity” (vraie humanité); that is, “humanity in ruins.”
	In the literary works that he completed during the same period as the essays on the Van Velde brothers, Beckett undertakes his own reimagining of the human beyond humanism. In his first completed play, Eleutheria, written in January-February 1947, just before “Peintres de l’empêchement,” Beckett presents in the figure of his protagonist Victor Krap someone who resists all attempts to define him within a humanist frame, the play ending with Victor “turning his emaciated back on humanity” (1996, 170). In the course of the play, the metatheatrical figure of the Spectator remarks that Victor can only describe his life in terms of what it is not, or in what the Spectator terms a “negative anthropology” (anthropologie négative) (147). In Molloy, which he began in May 1947, Beckett goes beyond the theorization of such a negative anthropology to its enactment. In the figure first of Molloy, and then of Moran, the novel enacts the ruination of the human, with Molloy openly declaring towards the end of his narration that he is abandoning “erect motion, that of man” (2009e, 90). In Waiting for Godot, written between October 1948 and January 1949, Beckett again engages explicitly with the concept of the human. In response to Pozzo’s cries for help in Act II, Vladimir declares: “To all mankind they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our ears! But at this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not” (2010d, 76). The vision of mankind presented in the play is again one of utter privation.
In the month following the completion of Godot, Beckett found himself having to translate (with considerable distaste) a short text by the French poet Francis Ponge on the painter Georges Braque for the next issue of Georges Duthuit’s journal Transition. Immediately thereafter, in March 1949, Beckett began writing The Unnamable, in which the literary vision of “humanity in ruins,” in accordance with a negative anthropology, is, for the first time, fully realized, through the utter “privation” of Mahood. Ponge’s article on Braque is significant in this context because Beckett’s negative reaction to it helps to cast considerable light on his own thinking of the human at the very moment when he was beginning work on The Unnamable.
In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre refers in passing to a claim made by Ponge that echoes his own existentialist-humanist view of the human. That claim, made in what Sartre describes as a “very fine article,” is that “Man is the future of man” (Ponge qtd. in Sartre, 34). Ponge’s assertion, Sartre declares, is “exactly true” (34). The text in which Ponge makes this claim regarding humanity is entitled “Notes premières de l’homme,”​[9]​ which had been written in 1943-4 and published in the first issue of Sartre’s new post-war journal Les Temps Modernes, on 1 October 1945, the month in which Sartre delivered his lecture on existentialist humanism at the Club Maintenant.​[10]​ 
In “Notes premières de l’homme,” Ponge reflects on that possible future of mankind, considering first the body and then the mind. Of the body, a remark that anticipates Beckett’s representation of the human in The Unnamable concerns body hair. Ponge suggests that the human being will in due course undergo a physical transformation that will include “a more complete atrophy of the ears, for example, [and] an almost total disappearance of hair [système pileux]” (1945, 67; my translation). Early in Beckett’s novel, the narrator declares that he is now hairless and that his ears are gone, although it is hard to see this as any kind of evolutionary or spiritual leap forward:

Why should I have a sex, who have no longer a nose? All those things have fallen, all the things that stick out, with my eyes, my hair, without leaving a trace, fallen so far, so deep, that I heard nothing, perhaps are falling still, my hair slowly like soot still, of the fall of my ears heard nothing.
2010c, 15-16

Notwithstanding these shared ideas on the future of the human body, when it comes to Ponge’s reflections on the human spirit, the difference between his position and Beckett’s could not be greater. According to Ponge, humanity has hitherto projected gods outwards, and what is now required is “to reintegrate the idea of God into the idea of man” (1945, 73). Ponge considers this new man to be “White and simple,” the embodiment of a “New classicism” (74). It is disturbing, to say the least, to think that Ponge, a committed Communist, should have conceived the human in this way in 1943-4, when it could scarcely be said to be the divine nature of the human that was holding sway across continental Europe.
Ponge’s deifying conception of a future humanity in “Notes premières de l’homme” is, as Kevin Brazil observes, at the heart of his short text “Braque or Modern Art as Event and Pleasure.” Written in May 1947, and first published in the post-dated January 1947 issue of the journal Action, this text was translated by Beckett in early 1949, at the request of Georges Duthuit, for publication in Transition Forty-Nine, No. 5, alongside Beckett’s own “Three Dialogues” with Duthuit. In Braque’s painting, Ponge finds the representation of everyday things—a pebble, a dead fish, a lump of coal, etc.—in a manner that (in Beckett’s translation) draws us “forth from our night, forth from obsolete man (and from a so-called humanism),” and reveals to us “Man, the Order to come” (1949, 46; 1977, 76). In Braque’s work, then, Ponge finds nothing less than an aesthetic revolution, one that is necessary if we are to see that new conception of the human within which the divine has been incorporated. “We are,” Ponge writes, “again flung naked, like primitive man, face to face with nature. The canons of Greek beauty, the charms of perspective, historiography, fêtes galantes, concern us no further. Not even decoration. What is there to decorate? Our dwelling is destroyed, and our palaces and temples; at least in our mind; they revolt us” (46; 75).
Drawing on Beckett’s remarks on Ponge’s text in a letter to Duthuit on 1 March 1949, Brazil argues that Beckett positions himself in antithetical relation to Ponge on the nature of the human. There is, to be sure, much to support this view. Indeed, in his letter to Duthuit on the matter, Beckett describes Ponge’s text on Braque as “revolting” (dégoûtant) (2011a, 122), albeit here deploying a word that occurs in Ponge’s own text.​[11]​ Moreover, he derides Ponge as “our great thinger”—alluding mockingly to Ponge’s attention to things, most notably in the volume Le Parti pris des choses (1942), and questions his aesthetico-political position: “For someone who is a pupil of the realists in politics he is pretty unsteady on his feet” (122). Citing from Ponge’s text, Beckett mocks the latter’s celebratory vision of a naked, primitive humanity that is once again “face to face” with nature, or the non-human. “What a relief to know,” he writes, “that we are back for good and all from the fête galante, and pitched, naked once more, in front of the dead fish (and the lump of coal)” (122; cf. Ponge 1949, 46; 1977, 76).
	It is not entirely accurate, however, to present Beckett’s take on art and the human as simply diametrically opposed to Ponge’s. For both writers emphasize the stripping away of that which seemed to make of the human a civilized being. Moreover, Ponge’s attention to things, and his attempt to let them speak for themselves, echoes Beckett’s own understanding of Paul Cézanne’s painting as the inaugural moment in modern art, on account of its breaking with anthropomorphism. In a letter to his friend Thomas McGreevy on 8 September 1934, for instance, Beckett had championed Cézanne as “the first to see landscape & state it as material of a strictly peculiar order, incommensurable with all human expressions whatsoever.” He proceeds to identify the “one bright spot in a mechanistic age” as being “the deanthropomorphizations of the artist,” with even portrait painting “beginning to be dehumanised” (2009d, 222-3). In a similar manner, Ponge celebrates Braque’s work for accomplishing what all true art must achieve, namely a transformation of the human. Braque’s paintings enable us, Ponge asserts, to perceive objects in a new way, freed from “the bygone language,” and “to name them anew, honestly, beyond all anthropomorphism” (1949, 46–7; 1977, 76). For Ponge, this process entails an abandonment of the aesthetics of the past and a return to the state of “primitive man” (46; 75). This abandonment of an entire aesthetic tradition echoes Beckett’s own approach to literature in the post-war period. Moreover, in his argument that, hitherto, humanity has lived only “the life of prehistoric man,” and that “man is in truth to come,” something to be constructed, Ponge asserts that the human individual currently exists only as a “nameless confusion and chaos” (désordre innommable et chaos) (46; 75). Not only does Beckett adopt (and substantivize) the word “nameless” (innommable) as the title of the novel on which he would begin work in the very month that he wrote to Duthuit to express his revulsion at Ponge’s interpretation of Braque, but that novel would be the most extreme attempt that he had thus far made to explore precisely this idea of the individual as an “unnameable disorder and chaos.”​[12]​ And, as we have seen, he also takes up in The Unnamable Ponge’s idea of the human body being stripped of various protuberances. Beckett thus seems to share Ponge’s resistance to anthropomorphism, his insistence on an aesthetic revolution that would abandon the Apollonian, as well as his appreciation of the human as an “unnameable disorder.” Indeed, the human thus conceived is precisely what Beckett is suggesting when, in his 1945 essay on the work of the Van Velde brothers, he refers to “true humanity.”
The decisive difference between Beckett’s and Ponge’s respective positions on the human lies in the former’s rejection of the idea that humanity is to be reconstructed, and that its task is to integrate the divine into itself. Beckett’s path is precisely the inverse of Ponge’s in this particular regard, since, rather than any reintegration of the divine into the human, he seeks in his post-war work to weaken the distinction between the human and the animal, a distinction on which Western philosophy has repeatedly insisted.​[13]​ While for Ponge, the role of the modern artist is “to forge […] the qualities of man to come” (1949, 47; 1977, 76), for Beckett it is to explore through a negative anthropology precisely the lack of qualities of “humanity in ruins,” disclosed by that historical catastrophe precipitated by a Nietzsche-inspired dream of the Übermensch, a conception of the human as transcending its very humanness by taking the divine back into itself.
Thus, if Beckett’s post-war vision of “humanity in ruins” differs from Ponge’s vision of “primitive man,” it does so above all in its stripping away of human capabilities, both physical and mental, and in its rejection of any future for the human that would take the form of its deification. Beckett’s “true humanity” is, as he puts it in a particularly revealing interview with Israel Shenker in 1956, a “non-knower” and a “non-can-er” (in Graver and Federman 1979, 148). In the same interview, Beckett states that the “Apollonian” artist is “absolutely foreign” to him (148-9), the implication being that, following Nietzsche’s influential distinction in The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Beckett is a Dionysian artist. It is, however, the Nietzschean strain in Ponge’s thinking of the human that is completely alien to Beckett, even though there are other aspects of Ponge’s vision of the human that are akin to his own, above all the idea of the human as an “unnamable disorder.” In The Unnamable, on which, as noted above, he began work almost immediately after completing his translation of Ponge’s text on Braque, the “privation” of the human—to employ the term used by Beckett in his 1948 essay on the art of the Van Velde brothers—is enacted in a manner that in part echoes Ponge, highlighting the complexities of his relation to the French writer. And Beckett’s negative anthropology, in which the human is defined in terms of what it is not, and is thus in a sense nothing at all, is also presented in a pedagogical context in The Unnamable, in the grilling of Mahood on the definition of the human: “Pupil Mahood, repeat after me, Man is a higher mammal. I couldn’t. Always talking about mammals, in this menagerie. Frankly, between ourselves, what the hell could it matter to pupil Mahood, that man was this rather than that?” (2010c, 50)
Remarkably, for all the privation of the human that takes places in The Unnamable, Beckett’s negative anthropology does not stop there. For, in the course of the 1950s, his already profoundly negative conception of the human takes account of a new historical context, in the form of the flood of new information on the Holocaust. The horrors of the Nazi concentration camps had been brought home to Beckett personally with the death of his close friend Alfred Péron, who had been interned in Mauthausen in 1942, and who died in May 1945, only days after his release. Beckett dedicated the French edition of Murphy (1947) to Péron, who had worked with him on the translation. In France, the literature on those horrors began as early as 1946, with the publication of David Rousset’s L’Univers concentrationnaire, which won the Prix Renaudot that year, followed in 1947 by Robert Antelme’s The Human Race.​[14]​ A second important moment came a decade later, with the publication of Elie Wiesel’s Night (1956) and the screening of Alain Resnais’s documentary Night and Fog (1956). While it is not possible to chart the direct impact on Beckett of much of this Holocaust-related work, he did see Resnais’ film, and, in a letter to John Manning dated 15 October 1959, adjudged it to be “very fine” (2014, 246). The dark vision of a decidedly inhuman human in How It Is (1961), on which Beckett began work in December 1958, reflects a further step in his imagining of a ruined humanity, one in which the influence of a Sadean cruelty is also to be detected. Indeed, the narrator of How It Is reflects back on his previous status as a human being: “part one before Pim the golden age the good moments the losses of species I was young I clung on on to the species we’re talking of the species the human” (2009c, 39). Beckett’s negative anthropology here entails a privation not simply of physical and mental attributes, but of species being.
	Having explored this idea of the inhuman human, in his later work Beckett returns to the distinction between the human and the non-human, and, in relation to this, between the animate and the inanimate. A key work in this regard is the short prose text Lessness (1969), where the human being is reimagined as a “Little body little block” (2010b, 129). The flesh and mud of How It Is has been replaced by grey ash, the inhuman by the non-human. That such a vision of the human had long been in Beckett’s mind is evidenced by his remarks on the paintings of Jack B. Yeats in a letter of 14 August 1937, where he observes that “all his people are mineral in the end,” suggesting the “inorganism of the organic.” Beckett then adds that “Even personally [Yeats] is rather inhuman” (2009d, 535-6). That said, in Lessness Beckett still insists on the beating heart and the two pale blue eyes. With Worstward Ho (1983), however, he takes a further step in this weakening of the distinction between the human and the non-human, when, at the end of the text, the human becomes a pin: “Enough. Sudden enough. Sudden all far. No move and sudden all far. All least. Three pins. One pinhole. In dimmost dim. Vasts apart. At bounds of boundless void” (2009a, 103). These three pins are not like any of the things to be found in Ponge’s work, any more than they are like the human beings to be found in Sartre’s. Through what in 1947 he terms an “analysis of privation,” Beckett ultimately reduces the human subject to a pinhole, for which all other human subjects are pins. The “true humanity” that Beckett finds in the work of the Van Velde brothers is disclosed first as (in Ponge’s words) an “unnamable disorder,” and then through a profound weakening of the distinction between the human and the non-human, the animate and the inanimate.
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^1	  In his letter to Schneider, Becket writes: “The leading Sophist, against whom Plato wrote his Dialogue, was Protagoras and he is probably the ‘old Greek’ whose name Hamm can’t remember” (2014, 73). Beckett’s “Philosophy Notes” do not, however, clearly support this identification, and other possibilities proposed for the “old Greek” are Zeno the Eleatic and Eubulides of Miletus. On this matter, see S. E. Gontarski’s commentary in Beckett 1992, 46–8.
^2	  William Davies (2017) makes a persuasive case for the text being, in part, an attack on the cultural nationalism associated with Irish neutrality during the Second World War.
^3	  As Davies observes, the typescript held in the Beckett International Foundation archives at the University of Reading reads “human condition” (in the singular) (see 172). Beckett had already encountered a major literary reference to the “human condition” when he read André Malraux’s Prix Goncourt-winning novel La Condition humaine (1933), from which he took the epigraph for chapter 9 of Murphy (1938): “Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du monde de ne pas rechercher les siens” (2009f, 99).
^4	  Over four decades later, Beckett employs the very same word in his last work, the poem what is the word (1989): “folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what—” (2012, 229).
^5	  In a letter to Thomas McGreevy on 26 May 1938, Beckett states that he finds Sartre’s first novel “extraordinarily good” (2009d, 626).
^6	  Beckett establishes a direct connection between his 1945 essay on the Van Velde brothers’ painting, and its capturing “true humanity,” and Endgame by including in the play the ‘story of the tailor’, or the joke about the world and the pair of trousers (see 2009b, 15-17).
^7	  As Peter Fifield argues (2011), a partial English translation (in all likelihood by Beckett) of “Peintres de l’empêchement” was published under the title “The New Object” in the catalogue for the exhibition Introducing Two Modern French Painters: Geer Van Velde, Bram Van Velde, at the Samuel M. Kootz Gallery, New York, in 1948.
^8	  The word “indévoilable” might also be translated as “un-unveilable,” or that which resists unveiling.
^9	  Ponge’s text concludes: “Man is to come … Man is the future of man” (75).
^10	  “Notes premières de l’homme” was subsequently included as the third part of Ponge’s Proêmes (1948). 
^11	  Ponge declares that our “our palaces and temples” now “revolt us” (nous dégoûtent) (1949, 46; 1977, 75).
^12	  Beckett’s linguistic scepticism also finds an echo in Ponge’s insistence upon the inevitable “failures of description” (échecs de description) to which the writer is condemned; see Van Hulle and Weller 2018, 150-1.
^13	  On Beckett’s weakening of the human/animal distinction, and the emergence of “indeterminate life forms,” see Weller. 
^14	  Rousset’s book would be reprinted in 1965 by Beckett’s publisher, Les Éditions de Minuit. Antelme’s was republished in the prestigious Gallimard “Blanche” series in 1957.
